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Moore, Causation, Counterfactuals,
and Responsibility

RICHARD FUMERTON*

Professor Michael Moore’s contribution to this symposium represents
a deep and thorough examination of the relationship between counterfactual
and causal tests, the meeting of which are often taken to be necessary
conditions for various sorts of moral and legal responsibility.1 After an
ontological investigation into the possible “truth-makers” for counterfactuals,
Professor Moore concludes that one cannot define causal connections in
terms of counterfactuals. Nevertheless, he also argues that one might
conclude that the assessment of counterfactuals remains a critical part of
assessing legal responsibility. However, as philosophers of law, we
should make it clear that we are substituting for the intuitive idea that we
are responsible primarily for what we cause to occur another and quite
different idea—the idea that we are often responsible for the world’s
being a certain way that it would not have been had we failed to act or,
for that matter, had we acted.
The importance of counterfactuals in law is not restricted to questions
concerning which agent’s action or failure to act, if any, is responsible
for a given harm. It became obvious from some of the discussion at this
symposium that whether or not we employ tests to determine at whose
feet harm should be laid, we will almost certainly need to employ
counterfactuals in deciding whether or not someone was harmed in the
* I would like to thank all of the participants in the University of San Diego
conference on What Do Compensatory Damages Compensate? and, particularly,
Michael Moore, for discussion that helped me see more clearly some of the issues
discussed in this paper.
1. See Michael Moore, For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual
Baselines, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1181 (2003).
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first place. Being harmed by an agent’s action or inaction could
plausibly be understood in terms of being placed in a state worse than
that in which one would have been in the absence of that agent’s action
or inaction.
Moore’s paper is so rich in detail that it defies a simple summary. Let
me begin by presenting an overview of the many issues upon which we
agree. I would like to begin this overview with a discussion of the “possible
worlds” account of counterfactuals. Professor Moore did a wonderful
job of exposing the philosophical vacuity of possible worlds accounts of
the truth conditions for counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. I
regard the frequency with which philosophers now appeal to the
metaphor of possible worlds to be a blight on our efforts to seek genuine
understanding. Hilary Putnam is surely right to characterize modal realism
as a “dotty idea.”2 Indeed, we would do well to keep firmly in mind the
philosophical slogan that there is but one and only one actual world and
everything that is made true is made true by some feature of that world.
Even truths about what is necessary and possible are made true by some
feature of the one and only actual world—properties of propositions,
thoughts, universals, ideas, events, and so on. When we are interested in
understanding the truth conditions for modal claims, counterfactuals,
causal claims, property ascriptions (both accidental and essential), and
the like, our task is to uncover what it is in the actual world that makes
the respective claims true. Again, one might think that it is but a harmless
metaphor to suggest that the counterfactual—if X were the case then Y
would be the case—is true just when the relevantly close possible worlds
in which X is the case are worlds in which Y is the case. Indeed, if one
thinks of talk about possible worlds as just talk about conjunctions of
propositions, then one might embrace Stalnaker’s suggestion that to
evaluate the proposition that if X were the case then Y would be the case,
we simply add X to the true propositions that describe the world and see
whether or not the conjunction entails Y.3 Of course, we cannot do just
that, for the truths that describe the actual world include both not-X and
not-Y. Therefore, we need to add that we make whatever changes are
required, implicitly or explicitly by the addition of X to the description
of the actual world. We use the word “required” and, if possible, mutter
it under our breath, because we do not want people to notice that our
account of counterfactuals has become circular. The “required” changes
include everything that would have been different had X been the case.
If we knew how to figure out what that involved, we would already
2. See HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM AND REASON 218 (1983).
3. Robert C. Stalnaker, A Theory of Conditionals, in CAUSATION AND CONDITIONALS
165, 168 (Ernest Sosa ed., 1975).
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understand the truth-makers for counterfactuals.
Notice that the above problem also affects covering law accounts of
subjunctives. It might be tempting to suppose that the contingent subjunctive
conditional—if X were the case then Y would be the case—asserts that
there is some law L (we need not have any particular law in mind), and
some set of conditions C (we need not know what they are) such that X
and C together with L entails Y. To avoid obvious objections we need to
add that X is nonredundant, meaning that C and L alone do not entail Y.
To meet less obvious objections, we need to add that if C is truthfunctionally complex, then none of its parts together with L alone entails
Y.4 Yet, once again, we do not take C to represent all of the conditions
that actually obtain. We hold C as constant as we can while making
whatever changes we need to make in order to describe the changes that
would have occurred were X to obtain. So when I assert that if Jesse
Jackson were Secretary of State we would not have gone to war with
Iraq, I am most likely imagining the world being different not just with
respect to Jackson’s political position. I am presumably also imagining
a world in which we have a different President, or a President who had
undergone a radical change of political heart sometime in the
relatively recent past, or an America whose people have radically
different political sympathies, and the list goes on and on.
As Professor Moore notes, covering law accounts of counterfactuals
face the additional problem of requiring an account of law that does not
itself invoke counterfactuals.5 The most obvious difference between
lawful generalizations (for example, that all metal expands when heated)
and accidental generalizations (for example, that all of the coins in my
pocket now are quarters) is that the former’s being lawful entails that if
this wood were metal it would expand when heated, while the latter’s
being accidental does not entail that if this penny were in my pocket it
would be a quarter.
There have been many heroic attempts to analyze the distinction
between lawful and accidental generalizations within the framework of a
Humean regularity theory of law.6 However, it would be an understatement
4. See generally R.A. Fumerton, Subjunctive Conditionals, 43 PHIL. SCI. 523
(1976) (claiming that those who try to analyze contingent subjective conditionals using
the concept of law approach do not always provide the correct analysis).
5. Moore, supra note 1, at 1197.
6. See generally RICHARD BEVAN BRAITHWAITE, SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION: A
STUDY OF THE FUNCTION OF THEORY, PROBABILITY AND LAW IN SCIENCE (1959); A.J. Ayer,
What Is a Law of Nature?, 10 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE 144 (1956); Carl G.
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to suggest that such accounts have been met with less than unqualified
success.7 One need not, of course, embrace a regularity theory of law in
order to offer a covering law account of counterfactuals. We might
embrace Armstrong’s suggestion that there are genuine ontological
necessary connections holding between universals.8 However wrongheaded Hume’s positive account of law might be, he did have some pretty
good reasons for rejecting this sort of necessary connection.9 The
necessary connection between universals holds, presumably, in virtue of
the intrinsic character of the universals. Since it does not make sense to
suppose that a universal could be intrinsically different than it is,
the necessary connection would presumably need to be an internal
relation—one that necessarily holds, given the existence of the relata.
Yet, internal relations seem to be such that we can know that they obtain
a priori provided that we can know the intrinsic character of the relata.
Unfortunately for the necessitarians, and, I suppose, for the progress of
science, one simply cannot discover laws by reflecting hard on the
nature of the universals whose exemplification they describe.
In addition to the above worries, Professor Moore also discusses
contingent counterfactuals that make no obvious reference to laws. If there
are ten people in the room, I can assert truly that if another person enters
the room, there would be eleven people in the room. As I understand
him, Professor Moore ends up suggesting that such counterfactuals are
really analytic. However, that does not seem quite right. It is still
contingent that if another person enters the room, there would be eleven
in the room. What this conditional has in common with other counterfactuals
is probably just that the antecedent together with conditions that obtain
entails the consequent, where, with this example, the existence of lawful
regularities does not seem to be necessary to derive the consequent.
In the end, I am inclined to agree with Chisholm’s suggestion concerning
counterfactuals.10 I think Chisholm ultimately argues that they simply
have no determinate truth value. Stalnaker is on the right track to
Hempel & Paul Oppenheim, Studies in the Logic of Explanation, 15 PHIL. SCI. 135 (1948).
7. The most promising are so-called contextualist accounts. In the past, I have
suggested that the lawful generalizations occupy a place in a hierarchy of generalizations
such that if that hierarchy conflicts with any other hierarchy, the hierarchy with which it
conflicts has fewer instances. Two hierarchies conflict when each includes a generalization
that conflicts with a generalization in the other. Two generalizations conflict when their
conjunction with the proposition that they have instances is a contradiction. I can do a
decent job defending this approach, but I cannot really bring myself to believe it.
8. See generally D.M. ARMSTRONG, WHAT IS A LAW OF NATURE? (1983).
9. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE §§ 1.3.3, 1.3.6 (David Fate
Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1896); see also Ayer, supra
note 6.
10. Roderick M. Chisholm, Law Statements and Counterfactual Inference, 15 ANALYSIS
97 (1955).
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suppose that, when we assert them, we have in mind the derivability of
the consequent from the antecedent and some set of conditions.
However, while the context sometimes makes clear which conditions we
hold constant in asserting the conditionals, it often does not. So, as
Chisholm suggests, we can assert all of the following (with appropriate
emphasis): (1) If that piece of metal had been heated, then it would not
have been true that all metal expands when heated (where here we hold
constant that it did not expand); (2) if that piece of metal had been
heated, then it would have expanded (where here we hold constant the
law that metal expands when heated); (3) if that had been heated, it
would not have been metal (where here we hold constant both the law
and that it did not expand). We should not even try to get involved in a
discussion about what would be happening in the Middle East if Jackson
were Secretary of State without first just asking what the person who
makes the assertion would like you to be holding constant.
Given the difficulty of saying anything illuminating about determinate
truth conditionals for counterfactuals, it might be a bit distressing that
they seem to play such a prominent role in law and morality. On the
other hand, they seem to pervade language. It is next to impossible to
explain dispositional concepts without them, and it is difficult to give an
uncontroversial example of a property that some well-respected philosopher
has not treated as a power. Therefore, I think that it makes perfectly
good sense for Professor Moore to assert that the prospects of
understanding causation using counterfactuals may be possible were we
to get a good understanding of counterfactuals (a counterfactual if ever
there was one).
I agree with Professor Moore that the prospects of ever understanding
causation employing counterfactuals are not particularly good. David
Lewis has tried very hard with one paper after another to handle
preempted causes within the framework of a counterfactual analysis of
causation. Nevertheless, he has had a singular lack of success.11 I also
agree with Professor Moore that the problem of epiphenomena (lawful
but not causal connection) is nasty,12 as is the rather embarrassing
consequence that without simply tacking on temporal priority as a
separate necessary condition for causation, we can get casual
11. See, e.g., David Lewis, Causation as Influence, 97 J. PHIL. 182 (2000). Lewis
thinks that the preempted cause is such that there are more close possible worlds in
which things would have been significantly different had it not been in the picture.
12. Moore, supra note 1, at 1227–30.
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connections (on the counterfactual analysis) between present states of
affairs and past states of affairs.
On the other hand, I do not agree with Professor Moore’s attempt to
drive a wedge between true counterfactuals and true causal claims by
appealing to thought experiments involving long chains of counterfactual
dependence extending indefinitely into the past, omissions, or even
concurrent overdetermination (though I will not talk about the last).
Professor Moore and I have had this argument many times in the past
and are probably destined to have it many times in the future. He is a
realist with a vengeance about causal connection. He thinks he can tell
which of the many different lawfully necessary conditions are real
causes and which are not. It may be that we disagree about omissions
primarily because of an underlying ontological dispute about the relata
of causal connection. I think Professor Moore takes the relata of causal
connection to be events (where events, like everything else, can have
properties but do not stand in causal relations only in virtue of their
exemplification of certain noncausal properties). As a result, he finds it
odd to describe not saving the drowning child as the cause of the child’s
death. A nonevent is a nothing, and a nothing cannot stand in a robust
causal relation to a something—the death.
Now, I am not even sure what events are. I think I know what a fact
or a state of affairs is—the exemplification of properties, nonrelational
and relational at a time. Also, I think I know how to individuate facts or
states of affairs. I am happy to view facts or states of affairs as the relata
of causal connection. But I do not even know how to individuate events.
When I played “The Star-Spangled Banner” loudly on the piano last
night, waking up my neighbor, whose mood quickly turned ugly, how
many events occurred? Was my playing the piano the same as my
playing the piano loudly? Was it the same as my playing “The StarSpangled Banner”? Was it the same as waking my neighbor? Was it the
same as my annoying my neighbor? I think Professor Moore believes he
knows how to count events, but I do not.
If we think that facts are the relata of causal connection, then there is
no reason to think of negative facts as any less causally robust than are
positive facts. My not helping the drowning victim is the truth-maker
for the proposition that I did not help the drowning victim, and it has as
good a claim to be the cause of the victim’s death as does the action of
the person who pushed him in the water. To be sure, Mill was right to
observe that “[t]o make anyone answerable for doing evil to others is the
rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil is, comparatively
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speaking, the exception.”13 Mill did not elaborate, but I suspect that if
asked to explain the difference, he would cite primarily practical
problems. There are usually simply too many people whose inactions
are relevant to what happened and we cannot plausibly go after them all.
As Harman pointed out, we also prize our freedom greatly, and a
proliferation of moral or legal duties to aid others would put too much
pressure on us to abandon the kind of life we want to live, a life free
from unpleasant intrusion by the state.14 Concerning Judy Thompson’s
famous example, I do not even share most people’s intuitions that it
would be alright to sever the lifeline to the violinist, though I cannot
imagine framing a law that would be broad enough to be useful and that
would apply to a case like this.15
Similarly, I think that, against Professor Moore’s position, it is various
pragmatic considerations that lead us to break causal chains where we do
for the purposes of assigning legal responsibility. Except in movies
about “dead-end kids,” we do not go all the way back to the criminal’s
poor upbringing to find actions we intend to punish in the criminal law
or the actors from whom we seek to gain compensation in the case of
civil law. However, I am convinced that this is so only because we can
so easily see how wild and uncontrollable the legal system would get if
we did not place limitations on how far back we go. I suspect that trying
to hold bartenders responsible for the damage their drunken patrons
cause is already a bit of a nightmare for the legal system. I am also
somewhat sympathetic with Lewis’s puzzlement about what to say of
concurrent overdetermination. However, I will note in passing that it
certainly is not the case that Lewis gets in any trouble with DeMorgan’s
theorem.16
Given limitations of space, I cannot even begin to plausibly explain
why we do seem so obsessed with causation when it comes to
employing criminal legal sanctions and assigning civil responsibility. It
does seem that, strict liability aside, we have strong moral intuitions that
13. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1977).
14. GILBERT HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY 100–11 (1977).
15. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 49 (1971).
16. Moore argues that allowing that disjunctive states of affairs can be causes,
when neither of the states of affairs in the disjunctive state of affairs is a cause, violates
DeMorgan’s Law. Let the disjunctive state of affairs be X or Y. From the fact that X did
not cause E and Y did not cause E, it does follow that it is not the case that either X
caused E or Y caused E. It does not follow that it is not the case that X or Y caused E.
See Moore, supra note 1, at 1239.
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we ought to let considerations of negligence (of one form or another) do
much more of the work than Professor Moore wants it to do. He is
committed to the view that one cannot so easily divorce questions of
moral culpability and responsibility from questions concerning what we
have caused or how things would have been had we acted differently.
That is because he does not want to identify the morality of an agent’s
action with the internal states of the agent—the agent’s subjective
beliefs, or, better perhaps, the justification the agent had at the time she
acted for believing that her actions would affect the world in certain
ways.
In the last few pages of his article, Professor Moore does a nice job of
defining the philosophical terrain. On the one side, we have the
subjectivists or internalists who are a bit puzzled over the fact that we tie
so many of our assignments of legal responsibility to factual questions of
what was actually caused by an agent’s actions. As Professor Moore
points out, even if these internalists become convinced that one cannot
define causation using counterfactuals, they are going to be equally
puzzled by the fact that we tie assignments of legal responsibility to
counterfactuals concerning how the world was made different by acts
and omissions. The subjectivists or internalists who identify the moral
character of an act with the internal states of the actor may concede that
we have actual consequence consequentialist intuitions. Yet, they also
think that those intuitions are not all that stable or reliable. They think
that, to the extent that we want our legal sanctions to hook up with our
considered moral evaluations of agents and their actions, we would, in
an ideal world, do things very differently.17 We might, for example, fine
people who act negligently, whether they harm others or not, pool the
resources, and compensate nonnegligent victims out of that pool. We
would not worry all that much about what caused what, or how the
world would have been different had the agent refrained from acting, or,
in the case of omissions, had chosen to act.
Why don’t those of us who resist the relevance of actual consequences
to moral evaluation of actions propose such radical changes in the legal
system? Usually, this is because we think that we have good reason to
believe that doing so would probably have some unwanted and very bad
consequences. In particular, we are probably quite right to fear an
17. For an attempt to explain reservations about allowing actual results to play too
prominent a role in the law, see generally Richard Parker, Blame, Punishment and the
Role of Result, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 269 (1984); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Decline of
Cause, 76 GEO. L.J. 137 (1987). Of course it is not at all clear that, as consequentialists,
we should care all that much whether punishment “fits” the wrongdoing. A
consequentialist would need a consequentialist argument for placing a great deal of
importance on this feature of punishment.
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overly zealous and overly intrusive state watching over every aspect of
our life to detect inappropriate action, or worse, failures to act. The
prospect is particularly frightening if we are right and the moral
culpability of an agent is a function of internal states to which others
often have highly problematic epistemic access. Nevertheless, we do
want to compensate people who have been harmed through no fault of
their own, yet we do not want to penalize everyone for the harm, and so
we somewhat artificially limit the people to whom we look to for
resources to compensate. Restricting our search for compensation to
those who have acted badly and who have caused harm through their
actions is one way to keep our task manageable. Further restricting the
casting of our net to those whose actions are held to be proximate causes
is a way of keeping it more manageable still. If Professor Moore is
right, and there are true counterfactuals about actions and inactions and
ensuing harms in cases in which people have been harmed but we cannot
find actions that caused the harm, then we might turn to those
counterfactuals in an effort to cast our net more widely. We do not
make a habit of this for the very reasons that Professor Moore stresses in
his paper. Counterfactual dependence spreads all over the place and we
will catch way too many acts and omissions than we want to deal with in
managing our problem of finding a culpable actor to do the compensating.
The full story is, of course, much more complicated that these brief
remarks suggest. Ultimately, the gist is that pragmatic considerations
are doing an enormous amount of work in justifying a legal system that
does not always tie responsibility, punishment, and obligations of
compensation to moral culpability.
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